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F AMINE AND MASS starvation are possiblities which the world
must face in the coming decades. Despite all the advances and in-
creases in grain production, the world situation regarding to food sup-
plies is at a precarious stage. Supplies and surpluses of grain have been
sufficient to meet world demand, but this may change within the
decade. The progression of growth of food supplies and population
predicted by Malthus' may reach critical levels.
A cursory examination of American agriculture reveals that it is of
great importance to the United States and the world. Agriculture is a
major industry for many American states and is also the largest single
industry in the United States.2
Agricultural exports are an important factor in the American
balance of trade, balancing in part the huge deficits created by im-
ports of foreign oil. 3 Exports are also an issue when dealing with trade
agreements and foreign imports by some of America's closest allies, es-
pecially Japan, due to the quantities of grain imported by these coun-
tries.4 The United States is the largest grain exporter in the world.'
Holding such a position in the world market, domestic issues and pro-
grams acquire major importance for importers of American grain.
During the 1950's, the United States Congress passed the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, which
has become known as P.L. 480. 6 The Act provides for food assistance
on cash or credit terms to nations in need. There are also provisions
for emergency aid when nations are faced with extraordinary needs or
natural disasters.
The recent actions of American government officials have come
T. MALTHUS, FIRST ESSAY ON POPULATION 25 (A. Kelley ed. 1965).
The Tractor Rebellion, NEwswEEK, Dec. 19, 1977, at 57.
3 N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
4 Use of U.S. Food Resources for Diplomatic Purposes-An Examination of the
Issues: Hearings Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 79, 81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Food Resources].
Id. at 74.
6 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended by 7
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736 (1976) [hereinafter cited as P.L. 480].
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under attack as manifesting the exercise of too much discretion.7 This
criticism and the current dissent voiced by American producers calls
for a major reevaluation of American farm policy and foreign trade.
This paper shall consider these factors and the continued viability of
P.L. 480. As a part of American farm policy, P.L. 480 must be
evaluated in the context of world population, exports and imports, and
the needs of American producers. With more food needed to feed
more people, the economic vitality of food producers is imperative.
The price paid by American customers for food must be part of any
economic formula of farm policy. As the breadbasket for the world,
the United States has a moral obligation to prevent the starvation of
millions of fellow inhabitants of this planet. In an age of increasing in-
terdependence of nations, a total view of world markets is necessary for
the study and evaluation of agricultural legislation. These factors shall
be considered in the context of P.L. 480.
I. PUBLIC LAW 480
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
(P.L. 480) authorizes the President to expand current international
trade, to develop new foreign markets, to increase domestic productivi-
ty, to combat hunger and malnutrition with emphasis on improving
agricultural techniques, and generally to promote the foreign policy of
the United States. 9 Title I of the Act authorizes the sale of agricultural
goods for cash or credit to friendly countries. 10 A friendly country is
defined as one which is not Communist or controlled by a world Com-
munist movement, or is not an aggressor against countries which have
diplomatic relations with the United States." Further, assistance can
S. 950, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2739, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.
2993, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
8 P.L. 480, as amended by Food and Agriculture Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113,
91 Stat. 913 (1977) [hereinafter amendment cited as Food and Agriculture Act].
9 P.L. 480, § 2. To enforce these provisions, special emphasis is to be given to
nations with serious food shortages. Domestic price and supply situations are to be
taken into account in determining the commodities exported.
10 Id. § 101. This requirement is evidence of the legislative purpose when the
legislation was enacted, at the height of the Cold War.
" Id. §§ 102, 103(d). Cuba and Vietnam are specifically excluded from Title I
programs. The United Arab Republic is excluded unless inclusion would be in the na-
tional interest. The President can waive any of these exclusions if it is determined to
be in the national interest. Egypt is presently receiving large shipments of grain under
Title I.
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be provided to friendly countries to resist Communist domination. 12 In
exercising his authority under Title I, the President is charged to con-
sider efforts by nations to improve their agriculture, to reduce popula-
tion growth, to take precautions not to greatly disrupt world prices or
trade, and to achieve terms favorable to the United States." The
largest recipient of Title I aid for 1974 was East Asia (Vietnam and
Cambodia) followed by the Near East (Israel) and South Asia (Pakistan
and Bangladesh). 14
The humanitarian slant of P.L. 480 becomes more apparent under
Title II. Under that title, the President is authorized to make aid
available to meet extraordinary relief needs, such as famine. One
million tons of food aid is to be distributed through nonprofit agencies
and the world food program.' 5 Efforts are to be made to encourage
other nations to contribute to world food programs and to aid in the
alleviation of emergency situations.'8
Titles III and IV are minor provisions of P.L. 480. Title III em-
powers the Secretary of Agriculture to exchange commodities for goods
used in other foreign assistance programs or for goods not sufficiently
produced to meet domestic demands. 7 Under Title IV, the Seceretary
is prevented from using agricultural products for P.L. 480 programs if
domestic supplies fall below demand.' 8 This section of Title IV has
never been used. To promote the national interest of the United
States, the President shall seek to increase farmer to farmer contacts,
to increase available commodity research and educational oppor-
-2 Id. § 1030).
13 Id. §§ 103(a), 106(a). Section 111 places restrictions on sales to countries with
per capita gross national product in excess of $300. The President also may provide
emergency assistance worth up to $5 million. Id. § 104(d).
14 American Foreign Food Assistance: Public Law 480 and Related Materials:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agricultural and Forestry, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
37-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as American Foresgn Food Assistance]. Only estimates
of 1975 and 1976 aid were available but the pattern of 1974 continued. The only ma-
jor difference was an increase in aid to Latin American. Under the 1974 Title II pro-
grams, the principal recipients were India, Morocco, Columbia, Brazil, Mali, Niger,
Sudan, and Tanzania.
' P.L. 480, §§ 201(a),(b), 204. The aid ceiling was increased from $600 million
to $750 million in 1977. President Carter has also expressed interest in contributing
more aid through the World Food Program in 1978.
'6 Id. § 205.
1 Id. § 303.
I' ld. § 401. Tobacco and alcoholic beverages are excluded from P.L. 480
regulations. Id. § 402.
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tunities, and to seek the establishment of an agricultural reserve system
to meet world emergencies.' 9
P.L. 480 was due to terminate at the end of 1977. The United
States Congress, by amending P.L. 480, has extended its provisions for
an additional four years. 20 Congress, by amending the legislation, has
made the determination that P.L. 480 is still valid in the 1970's.
However, since its original enactment in 1954, many factors affecting
American agricultural policy have changed. In light of these changes,
P.L. 480 must be compared with the current world situation.
II. EXISTING WORLD MARKETS
A. Historical Perspective
The present world population of four billion is expected to double
early in the next century.21 An increase in population means a greater
demand for food, especially in those nations with the highest rates of
population growth. This is important to exporters of grain, such as the
United States, in regard to production, price structure, selection of im-
porters, and communication between the developed and undeveloped
nations.
The United States has been a net exporter of agricultural products
throughout its history, but the "North American Breadbasket" has
become increasingly important in recent years. The United States is
responsible for thirty-five percent of world wheat exports since World
War II, seventy-five percent of soybean exports since 1949, and has
been the largest exporter of feed grains since 1951.2 2 The developed
countries have served as the major markets for American grain ex-
ports.23 Among the Third World countries, there are importers which
are hard-pressed to buy the necessary foodstuffs, while other nations
are readily able to pay for what they import. 24 The major competitors
19 Id. §§ 404, 406(a), 412. It is this reserve system which President Carter plans
to encourage under a world food program.
20 Food and Agriculture Act, supra note 8.
21 T. FEJKA, THE FUTURE OF POPULATION GROwTH 192 (1973).
22 Food Resources, supra note 4, at 79, 81. The United States has supplied 50%
of world feed grain exports since 1973.
21 Id. at 8, 9, 11. Japan is the single largest export market. Western Europe also
imports a sizable portion of American grain. Japan imports 90% of its soybeans, 70%
of its feed grains, and 67% of its wheat from the United States. Western Europe im-
ported 25% of the total American agricultural exports in 1975.
24 Id. at 18. The OPEC nations, South Korea, and Taiwan have economies
which allow for sizable imports, while Bangladesh and the Philippines are unable, at
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for these wheat markets are Canada and Australia.2 5 In 1976, the
United States, Canada, and Australia supplied seventy-three percent
of the world import needs for wheat. 26 The dominant American posi-
tion in agriculture is even greater in the area of feed grains, with
Argentina and Western Europe being the closest competitors. 2" Brazil,
the most significant Third World exporter, 2 and the People's Republic
of China are America's major competitors for soybean products.2 9
It is possible to speculate that three countries, the United States,
Canada, and Australia, could form a food cartel, as they control
sizable portions of food exports. There are three situations, however,
which make such a possibility unlikely. First, none of the countries has
made an effort in this direction. Such an initiative would have to in-
clude the United States because of its dominant position in this area,
although the United States alone does not have sufficient control of the
world market to alter prices at will. Second, the countries that would
suffer the most serious impact are those of the Third World, already
hard-pressed to purchase grain. Strained political relations between the
cartel members and purchasers of grain would almost certainly result.
Finally, the major American customers are Japan and Western Europe,
both able to afford higher prices, but they are also importers of
American non- agricultural products as well as exporters of finished
products to the United States. The major importers of American wheat
are Asian countries (especially Japan) and Latin American nations.
Japan and Western Europe are the largest soybean importers.8 0 The
European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan are the largest im-
times, to purchase the necessary food. India has begun to export grain in recent years
due to good rains.
25 Id. at 19, 74. Since 1951, the United States has supplied 35% of wheat ex-
ports; Canada, 23%; Australia, 10%; Western Europe, 10%; the Soviet Union, 8%;
and Argentina, 5%. These same countries produce 50% of the world's wheat. South
Africa, Thailand, Argentina, Western Europe, Canada, and Australia produce 17% of
the world's feed grains and supply 33% of the exports.
26 Id. at 74.
11 Id. at 80. Since 1951, the United States has exported an average of 42% of
world exports, 48% since 1970. Since 1951, Argentina has contributed 11% of world
exports, Western Europe, 10%.
28 Id. at 18. Brazil supplies 20% of world's soybean exports. Other grain ex-
porters include Kenya, Rhodesia, Thailand, Burma, and Mexico.
29 Id. at 19, 74. Brazil and China did have dificulties in 1977, resulting in China
purchasing grain from the United States.
10 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAu OF CENsus, FOREIGN TRADE DIVISION,
UNITED STATES EXPORTS, 1976, at 30 (1977).
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porters of feed grains, but within the last five years, the Soviet Union
has entered the American market and has made very significant pur-
chases. I
Several of the developed countries have taken measures to reduce
their dependence on grain imports from the United States. Member
nations of the EEC have replaced soybeans with lowfat dry milk as a
feed supplement and the United States has alleged that this is a viola-
tion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 2 The Japanese
have made plans to buy American grain when available in order to
buffer against price fluctuations. In 1975, the United States assured
Japan of top priority access to American crops.3 The Soviet Union, for
the period 1976-80, plans to reduce expansion of livestock production
and to increase grain production.3 4 These three examples, in several of
the major American markets, demonstrate the potential economic ef-
fects on both sides if a cartel is formed. A reduction in agricultural
trade, trade protectionism, and a trading war may result in the event a
cartel is formed.35
It has been anticipated that the United States role as exporter will
continue as the dependence of lower income countries on American
exports increases.36 Since the mid-1950's, agricultural production by
the Third World countries has increased by fifty percent, but rapidly
expanding populations will eliminate any gain in production." Among
the developed countries, the People's Republic of China recently has
turned to the United States for grain imports .3 There also has been an
increasing demand for meat, which incorporates a large consumption
of cereal. This relationship is shown dramatically in the case of the
Soviet Union when livestock production programs, initiated in the late
1960's, led to purchases of American grain in the 1970's.39
All of these events have increased the value of exports. For 1974,
these exports amounted to $21 billion.4 0 However, despite the growing
"' Food Resources, supra note 4, at 81.
12 Id. at 16.
33 Id.
34 Id.
11 Id. at 77.
36 Schertz, World Food: Prices and the Poor, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 511, 518 (1974).
31 Id. at 515.
3' Id. at 526.
19 Id. at 513-14.
," Id. at 511. Food Resources, supra note 4, at 77. The average annual value of
American exports for 1967-72 was $6.7 billion; for 1972, $9.4 billion; and for 1973,
$18 billion.
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volume of agricultural commodities, the quantity of products going to
food aid programs, specifically through P.L. 480 programs, has
decreased dramatically to levels near those of 1954, the year P.L. 480
was enacted." The average value of P.L. 480 programs has stabilized
near $1 billion, peaking between 1960-64, but by 1974, the value of
the aid was at its lowest point since enactment. The aid has been in-
creased since 1974, by recent estimates, to near its previous level of $1
billion .42
Funding for Title I programs generally is three to five times that of
Title II. The decrease in funding in the early 1970's was a result of a
decrease in Title I funding while funds available for Title II programs
have been steadily increasing since 1954. 4 1
The most important agricultural product used in P.L. 480 is
wheat. Wheat is generally used for direct human consumption while
feed grains are fed to another animal before human consumption. A
total of 187 million metric tons of wheat has been shipped under P.L.
480 and the present annual aid averages at 4.3 million tons. Feed
grain shipments have been reduced to an annual average of 0.4 million
metric tons. Other products shipped under P.L. 480 total 34.7 million
tons. Almost all of the above grain has been shipped under Title I. 44
Worldwide production of grain has been increasing over the past
twenty years. Increased demand would lead to an increased supply
when possible. Implementation of modern farming techniques by less
developed countries and exposure to new agricultural ideas may lead
4' Food Resources, supra note 4, at 76. For 1955 to 1959, the average value of
wheat exports was $701 million with $489 million, or 68.6% of total wheat exports go-
ing to food aid programs. For 1970 to 1974, only 24.8% of wheat exports was earmarked
for food aid, or $340 million.
During 1955 to 1959, 22.5%, or $104 million, of feed grain exports went to food aid
programs, but this has dropped to only 4.8% or $80 million for 1970 to 74.
This proportion of total soybean exports that is devoted to food aid has decreased
from 85% in 1955 to 1959 to 49% for 1970 to 1974.
42 American Foreign Food Assistance, supra note 14, at 33.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 34-36. At the height of P.L. 480 programs an annual average of 12.5
million tons of wheat and 2.5 million tons of feed grains was shipped. Total feed grain
exports has been 44.3 million metric tons.
Of the total amount of P.L. 480 aid, 159 million metric tons of wheat, 34.7
million tons of feed grains, and 25.9 million tons of other grains were shipped through
Title I. Title II programs have totaled 27.7 million tons of wheat, 9.6 million tons of
feed grains, and 8.8 million tons of other grains have been transported. These other
grains include rice, vegetable oil, and nonfat dry milk.
1978
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
to an increase in production by Third World countries. The advance-
ment of technology, increased production, irrigation of once under
productive or barren land, and introduction of new types of hybrid
grains have all contributed to better harvests and the availability of
more grain for export. Still, despite all of the advances and increases
in grain production, the world food situation is at a precarious stage.
Many of the developed countries of Western Europe and Asia have
come to realize the importance of controlled population and their
economic structure has allowed them to control their rate of growth.
Countries, like those of OPEC, have the technological knowledge or
the ability to purchase the necessary technology, information, and
equipment to feed their populations. These countries are also in a
position to be able to afford gradual increases in the price of foodstuffs
although a sharp increase in the prices may create havoc in the inter-
national economic structure.
At the other end of the economic scale, there are many countries
which are poor due to a lack of marketable resources or because their
population consumes more than the country can produce. Many of
these countries have no means of feeding themselves without massive
foreign aid. The key to any planned program of food consumption
must be birth control. This is one of the stated purposes of P.L. 480,41
but such efforts may be frustrated by centuries-old social and religious
beliefs.
It is also clear that the food aid programs are endangered by a
number of factors. The Soviet Union has bought grain from the
United States in recent years and it is possible that such purchases will
increase if the Soviets attempt to expand livestock production beyond
their own grain supply. The People's Republic of China is also in-
terested in foreign grain purchases. The possible entrance of this huge
market may greatly decrease the amount of grain available for food
aid programs. 46 In addition, other measures taken by some of the
developed countries may reduce their demand for American imports
and make available grain for food aid programs or for export to other
markets. 4
B. Recent Foreign Influence
The dominant position of the United States has been demonstrated
in wheat, feed grains, and soybeans. This position allows for the exer-
41 P:L. 480.
46 Schertz, supra note 36, at 513-14.
4' Food Resources, supra note 4, at 16.
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tion of a strong influence on world markets and subjects American
products to market price fluctuations.
Many of the lesser developed nations are able to satisfy their needs
by trade with the United States in years of low production. Such
demands are often unreliable in terms of long range planning and,
separately, the requirements of such nations are small and can be met
by government programs, such as P.L. 480. The developed countries
are more likely to engage in long term planning and consequently their
needs are more predictable. The requirements of large-scale livestock
production and the funds available for storage facilities allow for this
predictability. Because developed nations with industrial economies are
the largest purchasers of American agricultural products, they often
exercise the strongest influence on the American, as well as the world,
market.
It was predicted in the fall of 1977 that on a worldwide basis,
many good harvests were expected for 1977. Such harvests would mean
a lowering of grain imports and, in some cases, an increase in grain
for export. However, several countries were expected to import
American grain, including the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan and other
Asian countries which have been steady American customers. 48 For
1977, Japan was expected to have a better than average harvest with
general production up five to six percent. 49 However, the future may not
be as bright as these figures indicate. The United States has expressed
concern about a Japanese trade surplus, half of which is a result of
trade with the United States.50 A dispute arose between the two coun-
tries and as a result of negotiations a trade pact was announced in ear-
ly January of 1978. Japan agreed to undertake efforts to reduce an
$8.5 billion trade surplus beginning in April 1979 and to allow more
imports of American agricultural products." When asked in an inter-
view what was the greatest economic problem for Japan, the Minister
for External Economic Affairs and chief Japanese negotiator of the
trade agreement, Nobuhiko Ushiba replied:
Of course, agriculture. Our agriculture is really in a difficult situa-
tion because we have an accumulated rice surplus of nearly 4 million
48 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 21, 1977, at 57.
49 Id. Rice production was expected to be up 10%, fruit up 6%, and vegetables
near normal.
50 Japan Agrees to Slice the Surplus, TIME, Jan. 23, 1978, at 63.
11 Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1978, at 1, col. 3. These include beef and citrus
products.
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tons, and we have been pushing farmers to switch to livestock or
other crops such as fruit. If we open up the country to a flood of
oranges and beef-as the U.S. demands-our farmers would lose
confidence in our agricultural policy, which could be fatal to the rule
of the pro-American, free trade Liberal Democratic Party. 52
Although the agricultural concessions made by the Japanese will
have little impact on American producers, it has been viewed as a will-
ingness on the part of the Japanese to cut back on exports and increase
imports, contrary to traditional Japanese trade policy. It is hoped that
by 1980 the Japanese trade surplus will be reduced to zero.5"
The American response to the Japanese trade surplus may be
repeated in dealings with other countries which have a favorable
balance of trade with the United States. There have been no indica-
tions of this coming about but if trade protectionism is the current
mood of Congress and the Administration, an increase in agricultural
exports may be in store.
In Western Europe, Britain and Italy enjoyed record harvests while
French and German production also increased.14 The excellent harvest
could mean a decrease in the demand for grain imports from the
United States. Members of the EEC had begun plans in 1976 to
decrease American grain imports by replacing soybeans with dry milk
in feed grains. The expected result of this plan is the eventual reduc-
tion of soybean imports by 300,000 to 400,000 tons with an estimated
damage of $136 million to American producers.15 A resolution was in-
troduced in the House of Representatives, co-sponsored by forty-two
representatives, to seek elimination of the EEC practices and to seek
compensation for injuries under Article 23 of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.56
For Asia, 1977 was mixed year. The Japanese expected a better
than average harvest but agreed with the United States to allow more
agricultural imports, as discussed above. South Korea, Taiwan, and
India were expected to have good harvests. 5 For 1978, it is expected
that India will have a record crop due to favorable weather and im-
'" Ushiba: Manuvering Room, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1978, at 32.
53 TIME, supra note 50.
" U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 48.
ss ECC Imports Deposits on Vegetable Protein Products: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Agriculture, Sub-Comm. on Oilseeds and Rice, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1976).
H.R. Con. Res. 600, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
SU.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 48.
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proved technology,58 but India's storage facilities will be inadequate to
meet the demand imposed by this output. The World Bank, the
United States, Canada, and Australia plan to aid India in creating
storage facilities.59 It has been reported that there is a possibility that
Bangladesh could become self-sufficient by 1985.60
The People's Republic of China generally does not purchase
American grain, but rather imports from Canada and Australia which
recognize the Peking government as the legitimate government of
China. 61 However, Peking has turned to the United States at times in
order to obtain immediate delivery. In March and November of 1977,
the Chinese purchased American soybeans after experiencing delivery
problems with Brazil. 62
As a whole; the Asian market has been and will continue to be an
attractive market for the American producer. Sales of wheat to Asia
have averaged $900 million a year with annual increases of five to
twenty percent expected for several years.
C. Soviet Grain Purchases
The Soviet Union is a major example of a market which has
become available to American producers in the 1970's. In part, the in-
crease in Soviet demand has been created by expanding consumption
rates and a decreased supply in years of smaller than expected
harvests.
For 1976, the Soviet Union had a record grain harvest of 223.8
million tons. The harvest for 1977 had been predicted to reach 215
million tons but bad weather before and during the harvest resulted
58 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, at 3, col. 1. The use of hybird seeds, water
storage and irrigation, and the use of natural fertilizers have contributed to increases
of 30% in production in some areas.
59 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 23, 1978, at 46.
60 N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1977, at 27, col. 1.
61 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 7, 1977, at 54. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18,
1977, at D2, col. 6. Peking purchased 142 million bushels in March and 900,000
bushels in November.
12 Id. at 53.
61 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, at 3, col. 4. Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, and
the Cape Verde Islands had requested 500,000 tons of food. See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 1977, at D1, col. 1. The Libyans have made overtures to American producers
to purchase $60 million of grain. The Libyans have decided to deal directly with pro-
ducers rather than the United States government because Washington previously had
blocked the sale of cargo planes.
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in a revision to 194 million tons, the fourth largest ever, but far below
that of 1976.64 The Soviets turned to the West to make up the dif-
ference. Under a 1975 trade agreement, Moscow was required to pur-
chase six million tons of American grain, and if the needed grain
should rise above eight million tons, Washington was to be informed.
However, the Agriculture Department and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) had forecast the Soviet harvest at 215 million tons.
When Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced that the Soviet
harvest would be less than expected in November of 1977, the state-
ment took both American agencies by suprise. The Soviets would be
required to buy ten to fifteen million tons more than expected. 6 To
complicate the situation, much of the grain required by the Soviet
Union had already been purchased. During the summer and fall of
1977, grain prices were depressed in the United States. The Soviets
then purchased large amounts from European subsidiaries of American
companies and other traders.66 The Soviets had been able to exploit a
loophole in the Soviet-American trade agreement by the use of orders
of "optional origin grain"." In early October, a Soviet trade delegation
had come to the United States and was offered the right to purchase
up to fifteen million tons of grain in order to reduce American
surpluses.6 8 By November 2, the date of Mr. Brezhnev's announce-
ment, the Soviets had contracts for eighteen to twenty million tons
from Australia, Canada, India, and the United States. 69
There had been several signs that the Soviets were making grain
purchases. In July, the Soviets were contracting for ships to carry grain
and in an effort to keep secret this intention, the bills of lading were
altered at sea in order to disguise the ultimate destination of the ships.
World freight rates climbed by fifteen percent and in October, Chicago
commodity traders had heard of Soviet purchases, and American wheat
64 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 48.
61 Another Soviet Grain Sting, TIME, Nov. 28, 1977, at 88. See also U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, supra note 48, at 29. The announcement on November 2nd was 10%
below the CIA and USDA forecasts and 19 million tons below the Soviet goal.
66 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 48, at 29.
61 N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1977, at 53M, col. 5. Normally, exporters know the
final destination of the products and thus the United States would have known of the
purchases by the Soviet Union but the orders were made in a category known as "op-
tional origin grain," in which the exporter does not know the final destination or plans
to fill the order in another country.
68 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 48, at 29.
69 TIME, supra note 65.
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and corn prices moved slightly upward from August to October.
Through this process, the Soviets were able to save $100 million. 70
Despite the Soviet savings, the American producer may be able to
recoup part of the lost revenue. The Soviet purchases have reduced
surpluses and have helped to raise prices. 71 The Soviets are expected to
purchase another fifteen million tons of grain, which they had con-
tracted for in November.7 2 Other major exporters have sold most of
their available grain for export leaving the United States as the only
exporter with large supplies on hand." s If the Chinese or another im-
porter should need sizable imports they would have to buy from the
United States.74
A crisis, like those of 1973 and 1975, was averted due to record
harvests and the resulting low prices. 7" The CIA and the Department
of Agriculture were blamed for faulty intelligence gathering and the
possible grain shortages which could have resulted. 76 Secretary of
Agriculture, Bob Bergland, attempted to explain the inaccurate
forecasts of Soviet production as due to conflicting reports. 77
The reasons for the Soviet grain purchases are multiple. Since
1971, the Soviet Union, historically an exporter, has become a net im-
porter.78 The 1977 Soviet production figures were the result of bad
weather.7 9 The 1973 soybean embargo had its beginnings in the fall of
1972, when world demand for soybeans was high, and in February of
1973, when the dollar was devalued for a second time.80 The Chicago
70 Id. at 89. The destination was altered from Rotterdam to the Soviet Union
with trans-shipment by way of Rotterdam.
71 Id.
72 N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1977, at 33M, col. 5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1977, at
D2, col. 6.
13 TIME, supra note 65.
74 Id.
"5 Why Farmers Are up in Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 31, 1977,
at 60.
7' Safire, Against the Grain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1977, at 37, col. 3. William
Safire questioned the ability of the CIA, in light of the inaccurate information, to be
able to provide the necessary intelligence needed during a military crisis.
71 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 75. The reports were based on
satellite photos and actual observation.
78 Id.
19 Id. Weather conditions included a mid-summer drought and heavy rains at
harvest time.
80 N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1973, at 1, col. 8. The devaluation of the dollar made
American products more attractive to foreign purchasers.
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Board of Trade limited the trading of soybean futures on June 22,
1973.81 Secretary of Commerce, Frederick Dent, and Secretary of
Agriculture, Earl Butz, imposed an embargo on soybean exports when
faced with an insufficient supply for domestic use and anticipated ex-
ports, on June 27,82 but this was replaced on July 2 with an export
licensing control.88 In June, soybean prices had been high but at the
time the export controls were lifted, on September 21, the price had
fallen .8
In 1975, the Soviets turned to the West again when June produc-
tion figures were revised downward,85 which continued until it was an-
nounced that Soviet grain production would total only 170 million
tons. 8 On August 11, 1975, the Secretary of Agriculture requested ex-
port dealers to suspend sales to the Soviets until grain figures were
available.87 In response to possible domestic food price increases, the
maritime unions on the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
Great Lakes refused to load Soviet grain.88 The situation was relieved
by record wheat and corn harvests.8 9 Negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union culminated in a five year grain agreement
and an end to the sales restraints. 90 Under this agreement the Soviet
Union agreed to purchase six million metric tons of wheat and corn
annually for five years. They could also purchase another two million
tons without government consultation, but if purchases should exceed
eight million tons, consultation with the United States Government
would be required. The United States is allowed to restrict Soviet pur-
chases to less than six million tons if American grain production
should fall below 225 million tons in any year. 91
81 N.Y. Times, June 22, 1973, at 43, col. 8.
82 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
s N.Y. Times, July 3, 1973, at 31, col. 5.
, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1973, at 39, col. 5.
a N.Y. Times, June 11, 1975, at 73, col. 4. The USDA revised the Soviet harvest
figures downward, from 210 million to 200 million tons.
96 N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1975, at 32, col. 5. This figure was 45 million tons short
of the Soviet goal.
87 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
88 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
19 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
0 N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
' Grain Sales to Russia: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (Statement of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Charles Robinson.)
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The Soviet Union has had to turn to the West in order to meet de-
mand created by domestic consumption and increased livestock pro-
duction. Further, there are significant political ramifications tied to
poor Soviet harvests.
The Soviets have already moved into marginal and submarginal areas
for the grain production to meet commitments they have made to
their people to upgrade the Russian diet, by increasing the percen-
tage of protein in the form of meat.
This has created a condition in which they will be inevitably
dependent upon foreign sources. Where they have been exporting up
to 8 million tons of grain a year to Eastern Europe, that is phasing
out rapidly and Eastern Europe is now looking to us for their sup-
plemental grain requirements.92
The Nixon and Ford administrations came under heavy pressure
for the actions taken in 1973 and 1975. During 1975 and 1976, several
bills were introduced in the Senate to curtail government export
restrictions and to prevent actions to seek the "voluntary restraint" of
exports. 9 Mr. Rueben Johnson, then Director of Legislative Services of
the National Farmers Union, testified before the House International
Relations Committee in 1976, stating:
In 1973 and in 1974 and again in 1975 the Government has in-
tervened and is now interfering to prevent farmers from selling their
crops freely.
Because this was done without any guidelines, without any link to
a policy of food abundance, this has been the worst possible form of
export control. It has exposed farmers, American consumers, and our
export consumers alike to the capricious, irresponsible, and incompe-
tent whim of politicians in the executive branch, acting unpredict-
ably and arbitrarily under the pressures, the hysteria, and the
political motives of the moment. 94
Counsel for the National Association of Wheat Growers felt that there
was a possibility that President Ford had acted unconstitutionally in
seeking voluntary restraints of trade and that there may have been an-
titrust violations by the grain companies which went along with the
92 Id. at 8.
93 S. 950, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2739, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.
2993, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
94 Extension of the Export Adminstration Act of 1969: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1976) (Statement
of the Director of Legislative Services, National Farmers Union, Rueben Johnson.)
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voluntary restraints. 9 Mr. Tony Denchant, President of the National
Farmers Union and President of the International Federation of
Agriculture Producers felt that the trade limitations of 1975 had
reduced American crop values by $2 million. 96
The Ford administration took the position that the trade controls
were necessary to protect American markets.
As a major exporter of raw materials, we wish to improve our access
to other countries' markets for our exports and convince other coun-
tries that we are a dependable supplier. Excessively volatile price
fluctuations are a matter of concern both to the developing and to
the developed countries. 97
The examples of 1973 and 1975 show that there is the potential for
raiding American supplies by foreign purchasers. In years of high de-
mand, inadequate supplies could result in prices which only developed
countries could afford, proving disastrous to undeveloped nations. De-
mand for grain will increase as animal production and increased
populations place greater strains on anticipated grain production. To
avoid worldwide disaster, supplies must be maintained and increased.
III. DISSENT AMONG AMERICAN PRODUCERS
Despite what may appear as a bright future for grain exporters,
American producers have not been able to reap the maximum benefits
from their productivity. The plight facing American farmers has
reached a crisis stage for some. Prices for their products have come
down in recent years so that income from farming has reached a forty
year low. At the same time, expenses for seed, labor, and fertilizer
have been steadily increasing.9" Net farm income has fallen from an
average of $9950 in 1973 to $5300 in 1977.19 The total net farm in-
come has also fallen between the years 1973 and 1975.100 Many
foreclosures have been prevented only by the rising value of land. Based
on what has been paid for farm land, the value has increased by
" United States Foreign Trade Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 286-87 (1976).
96 Id. at 304.
91 Id. at 72.
98 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 26, 1977, at 69.
99 The Tractor Rebellion, NEwSwEEK, Dec. 19, 1977, at 57.
100 N,.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1977, at DI, col. 4. Total farm income for 1973 was
$29.9 billion, a record year. For 1977, farm income totaled $20.1 billion; for 1976,
$21.9 billion.
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114% in the last five years. The rise in value may become a thing of
the past as a 1.2% decrease in land prices was reported for the third
quarter of 1977. Farmers' debt has doubled since 1970, and now ex-
eeds $100 billion. 10 1
By way of reaction to these conditions some of the producers band-
ed together calling for a nationwide strike, that began on December
14, 1977, and now plan to continue the strike until they receive 100%
of parity. 0 2 The striking farmers have rallied around an organization
called American Agriculture, which claims the support of forty percent
of the nation's farmers. This claim may be unfounded as many of the
established agricultural groups, such as the American Farm Bureau
Federation, and producers of perishable goods, are not taking part.10 3
In any event, any increase in parity will certainly be passed on to the
consumer. For 1978, food prices are expected to rise four to six per-
cent but if 100% of parity is achieved, the rise could be by as much as
twenty to twenty-five percent.10 4
The Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland, sees the problem as
one of overproduction in that the American farmer is producing thirty
to forty million tons over market demands. 05 He finds the majority of
large producers need no government help and does not intend to give
them any. 0 6 A plan to set aside twenty percent of wheat acreage and
ten percent of corn and other feed grains has been established for
1978.107 Other recommendations have been made to cope with over-
production.
We recommend that supply management programs be voluntary. In
order to facilitate crop-acreage changes to meet market demands of
the future and to encourage the growing of crops in the most effi-
cient areas for those crops, we recommend that acreage allotments
and marketing quotas be made negotiable or transferable. In the
101 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 98.
102 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1977, at 18, col. 1. For a discussion of parity, see supra
note 98, at 70. Basically, parity is giving the farmer the same purchasing power for his
crop as that of'the period 1910 to 1914. In the fall of 1977, farmers were receiving
66% of parity.
105 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 98, at 70.
104 Id.
1*5 Why Farmers Are up in Arms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Oct, 31, 1977,
at 57.
106 Id. at 58.
107 Food and Agriculture Act, supra note 8.
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case of voluntary programs, the historical bases could be made
transferable. 108
In 1977, Congress passed the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977,
amending P.L. 480.109 There are three basic additions to the legisla-
tion. First, items for purchase under Title I are to be advertised so as
to provide for public bids. Second, the funding for Title II programs
has been increased from $600 million to $750 million. Finally, P.L.
480 has been extended to 1981.110 The Food and Agriculture Act of
1977 also makes provisions for setting aside acreage for crops, and en-
courages the President to seek development of an international food
reserve."' President Carter has acted upon this legislation. In his 1978
State of the Union address, President Carter stated that the United
States would propose contributing six million metric tons of food pro-
ducts to the international grain reserve." 2
IV. P.L. 480 IN PERSPECTIVE
Countries which historically have been exporters, such as the Soviet
Union, and countries which have been reluctant to seek imports, like
China, have increasingly turned to exporters, especially the United
States, to meet their needs. Some nations have been able to overcome
large imports and have begun to export grain, but in the case of In-
dia, the most notable example, this situation may be short-lived if the
weather does not cooperate. The demands of the Third World coun-
tries have been met by aid from the developed countries, through P.L.
480, and more recently through the establishment of the International
Grain Reserve.
The balance between world agricultural supply and demand and
the delicacy of this balance was brought home to American producers,
consumers, and government officials in 1973 and 1975. It has already
been predicted that between 1980 and 1985 food aid needs will exceed
the availability of American grain to meet those needs." 3 If this does
10s National Advisory Commission of Food and Fiber, Co-op GRAIN Q., reprinted
in AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN AN AFFLUENT SOCIETY 141 (V. Rutton, A. Waldo, J.
Hoock eds. 1969).
'0' Food and Agriculture Act, supra note 8.
118 Id.
M' Id.
lt N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1978, at A12, col. 4.
"I A. Montgomery and E. Weeks, Implications of Export Policy Choices for
American Agrculture, reprinted in FOOD GOALS, FUTURE STRUCTURAL CHANGES, AND
AGRICULTURAL POLICY: A NATIONAL BASEBOOK 301 (1969).
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come about, it will leave exporters with two basic choices, increase the
amount of food available through food aid programs, or leave those
nations dependent on food aid to their own resources. To complicate
this condition, some scientists have predicted a radical change in
weather patterns. Although climatologists warn that the data has been
complied over too short a timespan for concrete conclusions, they feel
that the earth is warming up." 4 The destruction of forests on a
worldwide basis may also be responsible for the increase of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. 1' 5
In light of future expectations of world demand, policy decisions
may have to be made regarding the amount and type of food aid that
will be provided to lesser developed countries. The International Grain
Reserve appears to duplicate the functions of Title II of P.L. 480. A
worldwide effort of contributing to this reserve and the sharing of its
products may prove to be the most effective means of distributing food
aid from the United States. The United States, as the world's largest
exporter, should take the lead in this development and should be one
of the largest contributors to the reserve, as should be other nations
with sizable exports.
As the International Grain Reserve duplicates much of the Title II
programs, Title II may no longer be necessary. Part of the purpose of
P.L. 480 is to serve humanitarian goals and to promote the foreign
policy of the United States. A program under international control, by
chance or the influence of the United States, may achieve the same
ends, but the furtherance of American foreign policy goals cannot be
guaranteed. This would seem to be the sole justification for continuing
Title II programs rather than increasing contributions to the grain
reserve.
The grain that was originally earmarked for Title II could be in-
cluded in the contribution destined for the grain reserve. Before the
1977 amendments to P.L. 480, the President was authorized to make
available, under Title II, a minimum of 1.3 million tons or $600
million annually in aid." 6 President Carter's proposal calls for a con-
tribution of six million tons to the International Grain Reserve."' For
the period 1955 to 1977, the average annual aid donated under Title II
114 Long-Term Forecast, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 1976, at 34. By the year 2050, it is
predicted that the atmosphere will be three degrees Celsius warmer. If this is the case, it
could turn the majority of the American Midwest into a arid plain.
" The Carbon Dioxide Question, SCIENTIFIC AM., Jan. 1978, at 34.
116 American Foreign Food Assistance, supra note 14.
1"7 N.Y. Times, supra note 112.
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was 1.9 million tons.""8 In 1962, 2.9 million tons was exported under Title
II, the single largest aid package in one year." 9
The appropriation of a minimum of $750 million for Title II pro-
grams, increased in 1977, can be used for other purposes. Any nation
which imports or produces grain must have storage facilities until the
food is ready for distribution or consumption. If the grain is not prop-
erly stored, it could rot or spoil before distribution. Aid from the
United States and other countries, and loans from international financ-
ing institutions, such as the World Bank, could provide the necessary
funds. The construction of storage facilitites may produce the added
benefit of grain purchases from exporters when there are surpluses and
lower prices. In addition, funds made available through Title II could
be used to curtail birth rates. The funds could be put to use in
distributing birth control information adaptable to the customs and
religious beliefs of the native culture.
Inherent in programs similar to P.L. 480 is the economic effect on
local markets. These programs introduce foodstuffs at a time when
supply is low. This basically has the same effect as a good harvest for
the recipient country. Local producers thus receive lower prices for
their product at times of high demand. The effect will be to further
increase the dependence of the recipient country on American grain,
thus increasing the market for American producers, but devastating to
the local farmers. Emphasis on agreements running over a period of
years, rather than the current annual basis, creates more certainty and
predictability for recognizing demand in years of less than favorable
harvests by providing a minimal level of requirements and the ability
to meet obligations and needs in other markets.
Unreliability of supplies can also harm American markets in
developed countries. In a year of short supply, the United States could
hardly turn its back on those countries dependent on American grain
in favor of more profitable markets. If the United States is unable to
meet the needs of the developed countries, they will turn to another,
more reliable supplier. Despite the importance of the above considera-
tions, primary emphasis should still be given to the American producer
and consumer. Under long-term supply contracts, which the American
producer can rely on to predict demand, he will be able to produce
according to this demand and to avoid surpluses and depression of the
farm market.
118 American Foreign Food Assistance, supra note 14, at 33.
119 Id.
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Any government program to aid the American producer, whether
in the form of a direct subsidy or through manipulation of natural
market forces to decrease the supply in times of overproduction, will
increase food prices. Controlling production by forecasting demand
can ease the consumer burden, while allowing for steady increases in
prices for the producers.
In light of the extensive Soviet purchases, the requirement of P.L.
480, that the recipient country be classified as a friendly and non-
communist nation, no longer seems to be valid. The Chinese have at-
tached part of the past to their trade dealings with the West, but faced
with the realities of food supply, even they have turned to the United
States. Because of these realities, the Chinese may be the next market
to open up for the American producer. With a population of nearly
one billion people, the People's Republic of China has the potential of
becoming one of the world's largest markets for grain and foodstuffs.
The Chinese have placed conditions on the establishment of large scale
trade relations with the United States, principally the recognition of
the Peking Government.
A major responsibility for the distribution of information to the
producers must fall with the major agricultural organizations. They
can prove invaluable in providing information of expected foreign and
domestic demand. Such information will enable sole producers and
producer cooperatives to plant accordingly, allowing for some surplus
to meet higher demand and compensate for future years when produc-
tion is low or demand is high.
Continued expansion of demand for American agricultural pro-
ducts is inevitable in light of world consumption and population fac-
tors. Population growth, increased livestock production, and diver-
sification of diets all mean a greater demand for foodstuffs and grain.
The Soviet Union is one example of a nation expanding one segment
of their agricultural economy while another segment is unable to pro-
vide the needed supply. Lesser developed countries suffer from rapidly
expanding populations and already inadequate food supplies. All of
these factors are placing increased demand on producer nations.
The type of aid that may prove most effective in the long run is
that which is designed to increase production in recipient countries.
The providing of food to nations with production near demand may
have the effect of depressing the local agricultural markets and
discouraging increased production due to lower prices. The effect may
be the dumping of surplus American grain in these countries and the
perpetuation of a market for imports. Aid in the form of information,
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seed, and machinery can encourage nations to become self-sufficient
for their food needs.
The Carter administration has indicated that it is interested in
changing the approach of the United States to food aid programs,
aiding those countries most seriously affected by food shortages. The
Carter approach is basically three pronged: (1) to increase the aid pro-
vided by private organizations and participation by a larger number of
organizations; (2) to increase congressional funding for government
agencies that are providing food aid; and (3) to seek greater coordina-
tion with agencies of the United Nations in aiding countries to increase
production. 20 This proposal begins to solve a complex problem but it
is only a start. A comprehensive evaluation of all phases of agriculture
may be necessary. Coordination between foreign exports and domestic
production is needed to insure supplies and to meet demand in the
future. An economically advantageous climate must be established for
American farmers to operate in, and to profit from their labors. At
the same time, market prices must be such that the farmers can profit
and foreign purchasers, especially undeveloped nations, can readily
purchase the commodities produced.
V. CONCLUSION
The outlook for American agriculture is economically good while
the world situation is facing grave pressures. All efforts must be made
to insure the continued viability of American agriculture as a valued
source of foreign exchange, to balance American imports, to provide a
livelihood for those involved in American agriculture, and to promote
the foreign policy of the United States.
It is not inconceivable that at some point within this century
millions could starve. It is even possible that there will be food
available but insufficient granary facilities would make necessary the
storage of grain in the open, subject to natural elements. Thus, P.L.
480, is an important program for achieving the stated purposes of
American agriculture and the Carter plans for food aid. Its impor-
tance surely will increase within the next decade as the world's food
deficiency becomes more apparent and American production of grain
becomes more essential.
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